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Today, it is common to hear talk of all kinds of “rights” which people allegedly “have”, even when 
no valid law says that they do. Human rights are an obvious case in point, at least where they are 
not invoked as quasi-legal rights (pertaining to a nascent international law). But also in more 
homely contexts, rights loom large. According to many, there is the right not to be lied to, the right 
to be treated fairly, and even, perhaps, the right to get a thank you note when you have chipped in 
towards a birthday present for your co-worker. These are all moral rights.
In this paper, I want to argue that moral rights discourse is surprisingly muddled. Not only is it rife 
with ambiguity. Right-claims imply ought-claims, and in moral contexts, it is often not clear which 
one out of a number of possible ought-claims a particular right-claim implies (section 1). Worse yet, 
there is the problem that the most popular reconstructions of moral right-claims come at a 
substantial philosophical cost. In particular, there is no uncontroversial way of substantiating the 
idea that moral rights are “trumps” like their legal cousins (section 2). If we want to avoid 
associating moral rights-discourse with controversial philosophical theses, we must interpret moral 
right-claims as simple all-things-considered ought-claims. But if we do that, it seems best, in light 
of the ambiguities inherent in moral rights talk, to stick to the traditional language of oughts when 
we wish to make ethical claims, and to leave the vocabulary of rights to legal contexts (section 3).
1. Some quite different uses of moral right-claims
As is well known, there are different types of moral right-claim. In particular, different moral right-
claims are meant to imply different ought-claims. In this regard, there are at least three different 
types.1 Firstly, there are passive rights-claims. Take “Mary has a right to be treated nicely” as an 
example. This claim turns out to imply that someone ought to treat Mary nicely. The addressee of 
this ought-claim can vary: sometimes, it is everyone; sometimes it is a subgroup of everyone. Apart 
from the openness of the addressee of the implied ought-claim, this type is relatively harmless.
But there are also active right claims, and they come in at least two sub-types: a simple and a 
complex one. As an example of a simple active right claim, take “Mary has a right to complain to 
the chef ”. This claim can be analysed as implying that Mary may complain to the chef, which – 
relying only on the vocabulary of oughts – means that it is not the case that Mary ought not to 
complain to the chef.
This claim is often confused with the complex kind of right claim. In fact, it may be that you have 
already wanted to read the aforementioned right-claim as a complex one. But let me give a slightly 
clearer example: “I realise that buying the Bild-Zeitung is stupid and harmful, but Mary surely has a 
right to do it.” The second (part of this) claim, I contend, is best analysed as implying only that it 
would be wrong to prevent Mary from buying the Bild-Zeitung. Note that this is compatible with the 
claim that one ought not to buy the Bild-Zeitung. For this reason, complex active right claims give a 
sense in which there is a right to do wrong. We can also say that we have rights to some actions  (in 
the complex sense) to which we have no right (in the simple sense).
Here, we have a first serious danger of ambiguity. A second one comes into view when we consider 
that frequently, an active moral right-claim to some action can be read as a claim to the effect that 
there ought (morally) to be a legal right to the action. (Perhaps this is a special case of the complex 
1 The following analysis is very loosely based on Wesley Hohfield's seminal work on the analysis of rights.
reading, where the addressee of the implicit prohibition of preventive action is the state.) Together, 
these ambiguities constitute a constant danger of misunderstanding. To get a sense of the  problem, 
imagine a scenario in which a father claims that he has a moral right to favour his sons over his 
daughters, and suppose that an interlocutor challenges this claim. Does the challenger imply that 
preventing the unequal treatment would be acceptable, perhaps even called-for? Or does she restrict 
herself to registering her disapproval of the incriminated conduct? And the father's own claim: is it 
about the acceptability of unequal treatment, or is it merely about the wrongness of preventive 
interference in case he decides to favour his sons over his daughters? Or is it rather a claim to the 
effect that current law is objectionable because it does not allow him the range of discriminatory 
conduct he envisions?
I do not want to overstate the case that ambiguity lurks in moral rights talk: careful speakers can do 
much to make explicit what they are committed to and what questions they leave open. But the fact 
that even philosophers needed a few years to solve the puzzle around the “right to do wrong”2 and 
the fact that debates over moral rights often go on forever suggest that the room for ambiguity is not 
just a curious and purely academic side note, but a problem built into rights discourse.
2. Reservations about rights as trumps
However, there is also a more serious problem. When we make a right-claim in a particular 
situation, we tend to think that we do something more than just talk about what people ought to do 
in the situation at hand (and in ethically equivalent situations). The intuition is that a right-claim is 
distinguished from ordinary ought-claims by something akin to a modal force. If I have a right to 
some kind of treatment, there is a sense in which being treated in a different way is wrong, 
necessarily, or irrespective of what (else) is true of me, my actions or the situation. This intuition, I 
want to contend, is best given up – unless we are prepared to tie moral rights-discourse to very 
controversial philosophical theses. Let me elaborate on this claim.
The usual way to substantiate the claim that moral right-claims have a quasi-modal force is to say 
that they trump other kinds of moral claims. In the background to this reconstruction, there is the 
thought that individual considerations about a situation issue in individual pro-tanto ought claims 
which then interact with one another to yield all-things-considered ought judgements. The thesis, 
now, that right-claims are trumps is nothing else than the denial of the non-monotonicity of the 
interaction of individual (considerations and their attendant) pro-tanto oughts, at least for some 
areas of deliberation.
Non-monotonicity means that every practical inference from an ethically relevant consideration to 
an overall ought-claim must be read as involving a ceteris-paribus clause without which the 
inference would be liable to defeat by an unforeseen disabling condition. The trouble with the 
current proposal about moral rights-discourse is that so far, no convincing evidence for areas of 
genuine monotonicity in moral reasoning has been presented. Every purported example of a moral 
principle without a ceteris-paribus clause turns out to implausible, and the only monotonicity that 
has been uncontroversially established is trivial monotonicity: it is always wrong to murder, but that 
is just because murder is defined as wrongful killing (among other things).3
Many philosophers now recognise that tying rights discourse to the thesis that ethical discourse can 
be non-trivially monotonic is too shaky to rest one's case on it. James Griffin, for example, accepts 
that understanding rights as trumps in the sketched sense makes right claims come out false.4 But 
most friends of moral rights, including Griffin, want to hold on to some weaker variant of the 
“trumping” idea.5
2 See Waldron (1993). The idea that some right claims are claims denying the acceptability of preventing an action is 
Waldron's solution to the problem of the “right to do wrong”.
3 For more on the non-monotonicity of everyday moral reasoning, see Kiesselbach (2010).
4 See Griffin (2008).
5 Note that this cannot be done by simply giving an abstract characterisation of the range of scenarios within which 
It could be said, and sometimes it is said, that rights are just very important considerations. 
However, as easily as this reply comes across some philosophers' lips, it forces us to attend to a yet 
more fundamental problem: it is not clear how moral rights can be “considerations” at all. To see 
the problem, consider what makes the idea of a right as an individual reason-giving consideration 
sensible in legal contexts. When we say “we ought to release Peter because unless he is charged, he 
has a (legal) right to being released after 48 hours in custody”, we say, in effect, that we ought – all 
things considered – to release Peter because we ought – legally – to do so: we derive an overall 
ought from a legal ought. Can something like this be going on in moral rights discourse, too? Might 
it be that moral rights give us restricted, pro-tanto oughts, which then enter into overall oughts?
There are plenty of ethically relevant considerations which go into our overall judgements. The fact 
that Peter is hungry, or the fact that Laura has failed to tidy her room, are examples. However, these 
considerations seem radically different from the consideration of having a moral right. Having a 
moral right is already morally laden in a way that being hungry, or having failed to tidy one's room 
is not. While it is logically possible to portray having a right as analogous with these kinds of 
considerations, this move seems like an attempt to justify a way of talking by way of another way of 
talking which is even more in need of justification. If we wish to speak in this way, we are 
operating, it seems, with an ontology which is far more complex than necessary. Here, then, we 
have another example of how moral rights discourse turns out to require commitment to 
controversial philosophical theses.
3. Moral right-claims as simple all-things-considered ought-claims
However, perhaps we need not go down that road. Interestingly, when speakers are invited to say 
what they really want to convey with their moral rights claims, most of them converge on nothing 
else than overall ought-claims, namely the ought-claims sketched in the first section. Perhaps it is 
not so implausible, after all, that when considered soberly, rights attributions turn out to be just 
assignments of duties to carry out, omit, or (in the case of complex active right-claims) prevent 
actions.
If that is true, however, then – in light of the space for misunderstandings – would it not be best to 
stick to the traditional vocabulary of oughts in the first place, and leave rights talk to legal matters?
Note that none of the problems of moral rights talk mentioned in this paper afflicts legal rights talk. 
Not only is there no problem with the ideas that legal rights are individual reason-giving 
considerations or that they trump other considerations. There is also no ambiguity of the kind 
sketched in the first section. It seems that the trouble with rights have appeared when rights talk was 
extended to cover non-legal matters: when rights talk was extended from legal (or quasi-legal) 
matters to non-legal matters, some of its grammatical features – rights as trumps, and more 
generally: rights as individual considerations – lost their sense.
Instead of searching for new ways of justifying these features in moral contexts, we can go back to 
the traditional vocabulary of oughts when making ethical pronouncements. What we lose is the 
sense of “trumping”. What we gain is a decrease of ambiguity – and, perhaps, a more realistic view 
of moral deliberation.
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the ought claims implied by right claims are guaranteed to come out true. This would -- again -- amount to a denial 
of non-monotonicity. But how else could the idea be cashed out?
